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MATERIAL CONSTITUTION AND THE TRINITY
Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem.
On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on
the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another wellknown philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension:
the problem of material constitution. We argue in this paper that a relatively
neglected solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed
into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity.

As is well known, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious
philosophical problem. On the one hand, it affirms that there are three distinct Persons--Father, Son, and Holy Spirit---each of whom is God. On the
other hand, it says that there is one and only one God. The doctrine therefore pulls us in two directions at once---in the direction of saying that there
is exactly one divine being and in the direction of saying that there is more
than one.
There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us
with the same sort of tension: the problem of material constihltion. This
problem arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share
all of the same parts and yet have different modal properties.' To take just
one of the many well-worn examples in the literature: Consider a bronze
statue of the Greek goddess, Athena, and the lump of bronze that constitutes it. On the one hand, it would appear that we must recognize at least
two material objects in the region occupied by the statue. For presumably
the statue cannot survive the process of being melted down and recast
whereas the lump of bronze can. On the other hand, our ordinary counting
practices lead us to recognize only one material object in the region. As
Harold Noonan aptly puts it, counting two material objects in such a
region seems to "manifest a bad case of double vision".> Here, then, as with
the doctrine of the Trinity, we are pulled in two directions at once.
Admittedly, the analogy between the two problems is far from perfect.
But we mention it because, as we shall argue below, it turns out that a relatively neglected response to the problem of material constihltion can be
developed into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity. In our view,
this new solution is more promising than the other solutions available in
the contemporary literature. It is independently plausible, it is motivated
by considerations independent of the problem of the Trinity, and it is
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immune to objections that afflict the other solutions. The guiding intuition
is the Aristotelian idea that it is possible for an object a and an object b to be
"one in number"-that is, numerically the same-without being strictly
identical.
We will begin in Section 1 by offering a precise statement of the problem
of the Trinity. In Section 2, we will flesh out the Aristotelian notion of
"numerical sameness without identity", explain how it solves the problem
of material constitution, and defend it against what we take to be the most
obvious and important objections to it. Also in that section we will distinguish numerical sameness without identity from two superficially similar
relations. Finally, in Sections 3 and 4, we will show how the Aristotelian
solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a
solution to the problem of the Trinity, and we will highlight some of the
more interesting consequences of the solution we describe. 3
1. The Problem of The Trinity

The central claim of the doctrine of the Trinity is that God exists in three
Persons-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This claim is not problematic
because of any superficial incoherence or inconsistency with wellentrenched intuitions. Rather, it is problematic because of a tension that
results from constraints imposed on its interpretation by other aspects of
orthodox Christian theology. These constraints are neatly summarized in
the following passage from the so-called Athanasian Creed:
We worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in unity, neither confusing
the Persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one person for
the Father, another for the Son, and yet another for the Holy Spirit.
But the divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one ... The
Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, and the Holy Spirit is eternal; and
yet they are not three eternals, but there is one eternal. Likewise, the
Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, and the Holy Spirit is
almighty; and yet there are not three almighties, but there is one
almighty. Thus, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit
is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God. 4
The passage quoted here is widely-and rightly-taken to offer a paradigm statement of the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of the
Trinity. Moreover, it tells us that the doctrine of the Trinity must be understood in such a way as to be compatible with each of the following theses:
(Tl)
(T2)
(T3)

Each Person of the Trinity is distinct from each of the others.
Each Person of the Trinity is God.
There is exactly one God.

Each of these theses is affirmed by the Creed in order to rule out a specific heresy. Tl is intended to rule out modalism, the view that Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are not really distinct from one another. According
to modalism, each Person is just God in a different guise, or playing a
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different role-much like Superman and Clark Kent are just the
Kryptonian Kal-EI in different guises, or playing different roles. T2 is
intended to rule out subordination ism, the view that not all of the Persons
are divine, or that the divinity of one or more of the Persons is somehow
unequal with, or subordinate to, that of the others. T3 is intended to rule
out polytheism, the view that there is more than one God. The problem,
however, is that the conjunction of Tl - T3 is apparently incoherent. For
on their most natural interpretation, they imply that three distinct beings
are each identical with one being (since each of the Persons is God, and
yet there is only one God).
In the contemporary literature, there are two main strategies for solving the problem: the Relative-Identity strategy, and the Social-Trinitarian
strategy. Both of these strategies solve the problem at least in part by
denying that the words 'is God' in Trinitarian formulations mean 'is
absolutely identical with God'. Thus both are well-poised to avoid the
heresy of modalism. 5 Furthermore, both affirm T2 (or some suitable variant thereof); thus, subordinationism is not a worry either. The real question is whether either manages to avoid polytheism without incurring
other problems in the process. In our view, the answer is no-at least not
as these solutions have been developed in the literature so far. Social
Trinitarianism we reject outright. The Relative-Identity solution we reject
as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity. (That is, we think
that it is successful only if it is supplemented by a story about the metaphysics of relative-identity relations. More on this at the end of Section 2
below). Since we have already explained elsewhere why we find these
solutions unsatisfying, we will not repeat the details of our objections
here. 6 Instead, we'll simply summarize by saying that we reject both the
Social Trinitarian solution and existing versions of the Relative Identity
solution because they fail to provide an account of the Trinity that satisfies the following five desiderata:
(01)
(02)
(03)
(04)
(05)

It is clearly consistent with the view that Father, Son, and

Holy Spirit are divine individuals, and that there is exactly
one divine individual.
It does not conflict with a natural reading of either the Bible
or the ecumenical creeds.
It is consistent with the view that God is an individual rather
than a society, and that the Persons are not parts of God. 7
It is consistent with the view that classical identity exists and
is not to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental sortalrelativized sameness relations like being the same person as.
It carries no anti-realist commitments in metaphysics.

The Social Trinitarian solution violates 01 - 03. Extant versions of the
Relative Identity solution violate 01, 04, or 05. As will emerge shortly, our
solution, which may fruitfully be thought of as an appropriately supplemented version of the Relative Identity solution, succeeds precisely where
these others fail-namely, in satisfying all five desiderata.
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2. Sameness Without Identity and the Problem of Material Constitution

The point of departure for our solution is Aristotle's notion of "accidental
sameness". Elsewhere, we have proposed (for the sake of argument, at any
rate) that the phenomenon of material constitution be understood in terms
of accidental sameness. 8 What we here propose is that the unity of the
divine Persons also be understood in terms of this relation (or more accurately, in terms of the genus of which it is a species-namely, numerical
sameness without identity"). In this section, therefore, we review the way
in which appeal to accidental sameness provides a solution to the problem
of material constitution and address what we take to be the most natural
objections to it.
2.1 Accidental Sameness Characterized. According to Aristotle, familiar par-

ticulars (trees, cats, human beings, etc.) are hylomorphic compoundsthings that exist because and just so long as some matter instantiates a certain kind of form. Forms, for Aristotle, are complex organizational properties, and properties are immanent universals (or, as some have it, tropes).
The matter of a thing is not itself an individual thing; rather, it is that which
combines with a form to make an individual thing. 1O Thus, for example, a
human being exists just in case some matter instantiates the complex organizational property humanity. Each human being depends for its continued
existence on the continued instantiation of humanity by some matter; and
each human being is appropriately viewed as a composite whose parts (at
one level of decomposition) are just its matter and (its) humanity.l1
On Aristotle's view, living organisms are the paradigmatic examples of
material objects. But Aristotle also acknowledges the existence of other
hylomorphic compounds. Thus, books, caskets, beds, thresholds, hands,
hearts, and various other non-organisms populate his ontology, and (like
an organism) each one exists because and only so long as some matter
instantiates a particular complex organizational property.12 Indeed,
Aristotle even countenances what Gareth Matthews calls "kooky"
objects-objects like 'seated-Socrates', a thing that comes into existence
when Socrates sits down and which passes away when Socrates ceases to
be seatedY Seated-Socrates is an 'accidental unity'-a unified thing that
exists only by virtue of the instantiation of an accidental (non-essential)
property (like seatedness) by a substance (like Socrates). The substance
plays the role of matter in this sort of hylomorphic compound (though, of
course, unlike matter properly conceived, the substance is a pre-existing
individual thing), and the accidental property plays the role of form.
Accidental sameness, according to Aristotle, is just the relation that obtains
between an accidental unity and its parent substance. 14
One might balk at this point on the grounds that Aristotle's accidental
unities are just a bit too kooky for serious ontology. We see that Socrates
has seated himself; but why believe that in doing so he has brought into
existence a new object-seated-Socrates? Indeed, one might think it's clear
that we shouldn't believe this. For there is nothing special about seatedness,
and so, if we acknowledge the existence of seated-Socrates, we must also
acknowledge the existence of a myriad other kooky objects: pale-Socrates,
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bald-Socrates, barefoot-Socrates, and so on. But surely there are not millions of objects completely overlapping Socrates.
Fair enough; and nothing here depends on our believing in seatedSocrates or his cohorts. But note that, regardless of what we think of seated-Socrates, we (fans of common sense) believe in many things relevantly
like seated-Socrates. That is, we believe in things that are very plausibly
characterized as hylomorphic compounds whose matter is a familiar material object and whose form is an accidental property. For example, we believe
in fists and hands, bronze statues and lumps of bronze, cats and heaps of
cat tissue, and so on. Why we should believe all this but not that sitting
down is a way of replacing one kind of object (a standing-man) with another (a seated-man) is an interesting and surprisingly difficult question. But
never mind that for now. The important point here is that, whether we go
along with Aristotle in believing in what he calls accidental unities, the fact
is that many of us will be inclined to believe in things relevantly like accidental unities along with other things that are relevantly like the parent
substances of accidental unities.
This last point is important because the things we have listed as being
relevantly like accidental unities and their parent substances are precisely
the sorts of things belief in which gives rise to the problem of material constitution. Hence the relevance of Aristotle's doctrine of accidental sameness. Aristotle agrees with common sense in thinking that there is only one
material object that fills the region occupied by Socrates when he is seated.
Thus, he says that the relation between accidental unities and their parent
substances is a variety of numerical sameness. Socrates and seated-Socrates
are, as he would put it, one in number but not one in being. IS They are distinct, but they are to be counted as one material object. lo But once one is
committed to believing in such a relation, one has a solution to the problem
of material constitution ready to hand. Recall that the problem arises
whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same
parts and yet have different modal properties. In such cases we are pushed
in the direction of denying that the relevant a and b are identical and yet
we also want to avoid saying that they are two material objects occupying
the same place at the same time. Belief in the relation of accidental sameness solves this problem because it allows us to deny that the relevant a
and b are identical without thereby committing us to the claim that a and b
are two material objects. Thus, one can continue to believe that (e.g.) there
are bronze statues and lumps of bronze, that every region occupied by a
bronze statue is occupied by a lump of bronze, that no bronze statue is
identical to a lump of bronze (after all, statues and lumps have different
persistence conditions), but also that there are never two material objects
occupying precisely the same place at the same time. One can believe all
this because one can say that bronze statues and their constitutive lumps
stand in the relation of accidental sameness: they are one in number but
not one in being.
2.2 Accidental Sameness Defended. But should we believe in accidental sameness? The fact of the matter is that this sort of solution to the problem of
material constitution is probably the single most neglected solution to that
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problem in the contemporary literature; and it is not hard to see why.
Initially it is hard to swallow the idea that there is a variety of numerical
sameness that falls short of identity. But, in our view, the most obvious and
serious objections are failures, and the bare fact that the doctrine of accidental sameness is counterintuitive is mitigated by the fact that every solution to the problem of material constitution is counterintuitive (a fact which
largely explains the problem's lasting philosophical interest). In the
remainder of this section, we will address what we take to be the four most
serious objections against the doctrine of accidental sameness. We will also
explain how the relation of accidental sameness differs from two other
relations to which it bears some superficial resemblance. In doing all this,
we hope to shed further light on the metaphysics of material objects that
attends belief in accidental sameness.
First objection: Most contemporary philosophers think that, for any
material objects a and b, a and b are to be counted as one if and only if a and
b are identical. Indeed, it is fairly standard to define number in terms of
identity, as follows:
(IF)
(2F)

there is exactly one F =df 3x(Fx & 'Vy(Fy == Y = x)
there are exactly two Fs =df 3x3y(Fx & Fy & x#- y &'Vz(Fz == y = z
v x ==z)

etc.
But if that is right, then it is hard to see how there could be a relation that
does not obey Leibniz's Law but is nevertheless such that objects standing
in that relation are to be counted as one.
Obviously enough, a believer in accidental sameness must reject standard definitions like IF and 2F. But this does not seem to us to be an especially radical move. As is often pointed out, common sense does not
always count by identity.17 If you sell a piano, you won't charge for the
piano and for the lump of wood, ivory, and metal that constitutes it. As a
fan of common sense, you will probably believe that there are pianos and
lumps, and that the persistence conditions of pianos differ from the persistence conditions of lumps. Still, for sales purposes, and so for common
sense counting purposes, pianos and their constitutive lumps are counted
as one material object. One might say that common sense is wrong to count
this way. But why go along with that? Even if we grant that IF and its relatives are strongly intuitive, we must still reckon with the fact that we have
strong intuitions that support the following:
(Me)

In the region occupied by a bronze statue, there is a statue
and there is a lump of bronze; the lump is not identical with
the statue (the statue but not the lump would be destroyed if
the lump were melted down and recast in the shape of a
disc); but only one material object fills that region.

If we did not have intuitions that support Me, there would be no problem of
material constitution. But if Me is true, then IF and its relatives are false, and
there seems to be no compelling reason to prefer the latter over the former.
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Of course, if rejecting IF and its relatives were to leave us without any
way of defining number, then our move would be radical, and there would
be compelling reason to give up MC But the fact is, rejecting IF and its relatives does not leave us in any such situation. Indeed, belief in accidental
sameness doesn't even preclude us altogether from counting by identity.
At worst, it simply requires us to acknowledge a distinction between sortals that permit counting by identity and sortals that do not. For example,
according to the believer in accidental sameness, we do not count material
objects by identity. Rather, we count them by numerical sameness (the
more general relation of which both accidental sameness and identity are
species). Thus:
(1M)
(2M)

there is exactly one material object =df3x(X is a material object
& Vy(y is a material object == y is numerically the same as x))
there are exactly two material objects =df3x3y(x is a material
object & y is a material object and x is not numerically the
same as y and Vz(z is a material object == z is numerically the
same as x or z is numerically the same as y)

etc.

Perhaps the same is true for other familiar sortals. For example: Suppose a
lump of bronze that constitutes a bronze statue is nominally, but not essentially, a statue. 18 Then the lump and the statue are distinct, and both are statues. But, intuitively, the region occupied by the lump / statue is occupied by
only one statue. Thus, given the initial supposition, we should not count statues by identity either. Nevertheless, we can still grant that there are some
sortals that do allow us to count by identity. Likely candidates are technical
philosophical sortals like 'hylomorphic compound', or maximally general
sortals, like 'thing' or 'being'. For such sortals, number terms can be defined
in the style of IF and its relatives. Admittedly, the business of definillg number is a bit more complicated for those who believe in accidental sameness
(we must recognize at least two different styles of defining number corresponding to two different kinds of sortal terms). The important point, however, is that it is not impossible.
In saying what we have about the categories of hylomorphic compound,
thing, and being, we grant that proponents of our Aristotelian solution to the
problem of material constitution are committed to a kind of co-Iocationism.
Although cases of material constitution will never, on the view we are
proposing, present us with two material objects in the same place at the
same time, they will present us with (at least) two hylomorphic compounds or
things in the same place at the same time. But we deny that this commitrnent
is problematic. By our lights, it is a conceptual truth that material objects cannot be co-located; but it is not a conceptual truth that hylomorphjc compounds (e.g., a statue and a lump, a fist and a hand, etc.) or things (e.g., a
material object and an event) cannot be co-located. We take it as an advantage of the Aristotelian solution that it respects these prima facie truths.
Second objection: To say that hylomorphic compounds, or mere things,
can be co-located but material objects cannot smacks of pretense. For while
it preserves the letter, it does not preserve the spirit of the intuition that
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material objects cannot be co-located. If counting two material objects in
the same place at the same time "reeks of double counting",'9then the same
reek must attend the counting of two hylomorphic compounds or two
things in the same place at the same time. At best, therefore, the
Aristotelian solution is only verbally distinct from the co-Iocationist solution. For co-Iocationists and fans of accidental sameness will still have the
same metaphysical story to tell about statues and their constitutive lumpsnamely, that they are distinct, despite occupying precisely the same region
of spacetime-and that metaphysical story is all that matters.
But this objection is sound only on the assumption that the properties
being a material object, being a hylomorphic compound, and being a thing are on
a par with one another. From x is a hylomorphic compound & y is a hylomorphic compound & x "" y, we rightly infer that x and yare two hylomorphic compounds. And if, somehow, we come to believe that x and y are colocated, we'd have no choice but to conclude that x and yare two distinct
hylomorphic compounds sharing the same place at the same time. The reason is that the following seems to be a necessary truth about the property
of being a hylomorphic compound:
(HI)

x is a hylomorphic compound iff x is a matter-form composite; exactly one hylomorphic compound fills a region R iff
some matter instantiates exactly one form; and x is (numerically) the same hylomorphic compound as y iff x is a hylomorphic compound and x = y.

According to the second objection, a parallel principle expresses a necessary truth about the property of being a material object:
(MI)

x is a material object iff x is a hylomorphic compound; exactly one material object fills a region R iff exactly one hylomorphic compound fills R; and x is (numerically) the same material object as y iff x is a material object and x = y

Note that MI is not a mere linguistic principle; it is a substantive claim
about the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a material object in
a region, having exactly one material object in a region, and having (numerically) the same material object in a region. But MI is a claim that will be
denied by proponents of the Aristotelian solution we have been describing
here. As should by now be clear, proponents of that solution will reject MI
in favor of something like M2:
(M2)

x is a material object iff x is a hylomorphic compound; exactly one material object fills a region R iff at least one hylomorphic compound fills R; and x is (numerically) the same material object as y iff x and yare hylomorphic compounds sharing the same matter in common.

M2 is equivalent to MI on the assumption that no two hylomorphic compounds can share the same matter in common; but, short of treating the
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technical philosophical category hylomorphic compound as co-extensive with
the common-sense category material object, it is hard to see what would
motivate that assumption. Thus, there is room for disagreement on the
question whether M2 is true or whether M2 is equivalent to Ml; and,
importantly, accidental-sameness theorists and co-Iocationists will come
down on different sides of those questions. Thus, there is a substantive (as
opposed to a merely verbal) disagreement to be had here after all.
Two further points should be made before we move on to the third
objection. First, though M2 is specifically a thesis about the property being
a material object, the doctrine of accidental sameness makes it plausible to
think that similar theses about various other properties will be true. In particular, if one thinks that sortals like 'cat', 'house', 'lump', 'statue', and so
on can apply nominally to things that constitute cats, houses, lumps, or
statues, then something like M2 is true of most familiar composite object
kinds. Second, though it may be tempting to think that the relation of accidental sameness (or of numerical sameness without identity) is nothing
other than the relation of sharing exactly the same matter, as we see it, this
isn't quite correct. On our view (though probably not on Aristotle's), the
relation of numerical sameness without identity can hold between immaterial objects, so long as the relevant immaterial objects are plausibly thought
of on analogy with hylomorphic compounds. Thus, it is inappropriate to
say (as might so far seem natural to say) that the relation of numerical
sameness without identity is nothing other than the relation of material
constitution. Rather, what is appropriate to say is that material constitution is a species of numerical sameness without identity.
Third objection: The principles for counting that we have just described
(i.e., HI and M2) are apparently inconsistent with the doctrine of accidental
sameness. To see why, consider the following argument. Let Athena be a
particular bronze statue; let Lump be the lump of bronze that constitutes it.
Let R be the region filled by Athena and Lump. Then:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Athena is identical with the material object in R whose matter is
arranged statuewise.
Lump is identical with the material object in R whose matter is
arranged lumpwise.
The material object whose matter is arranged statuewise is
identical with the material object whose matter is arranged
lumpwise.
Therefore, Athena is identical with Lump (contrary to the doctrine of accidental sameness).

The crucial premise, of course, is premise 3; and premise 3 seems to follow
directly from a proposition that is entailed by the facts of the example in
conjunction with our remarks about counting-namely, that there is exactly one object in R whose matter is arranged both statuewise and lumpwise.
On reflection, however, it is easy to see that this objection is a nonstarter.
For premise 3 follows only if the doctrine of accidental sameness is false.
Numerical sameness, according to Aristotle, does not entail identity. Thus,
if his view is correct, it does not follow from the fact that there is exactly
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one material object in R whose matter is arranged both statuewise and
lumpwise that the object whose matter is arranged lumpwise is identical
with the object whose matter is arranged statuewise. Simply to assume
otherwise, then, is to beg the question. One might insist that the assumption is nevertheless highly intuitive, and therefore legitimate. But, again,
the right response here is that every solution to the problem of material constitution is such that its denial is highly intuitive. That is why we have a
problem. Successfully rejecting a solution requires showing that the intuitive cost is higher with the objectionable solution than with some other
solution; but, with respect to the doctrine of accidental sameness, this has
not yet been done.
Fourth objection: We say that there is one (and only one) material object
that fills a region just in case the region is filled by matter unified in any
object-constituting way. So consider a region R that is filled by matter
arranged both lumpwise and statuewise. What is the object in R? What are
its essential properties? If there is exactly one object in R, these two questions should have straightforward answers. But they do not (at least not so
long as we continue to say that there is a statue and a lump in R). Thus,
there is reason to doubt that there could really be exactly one object in R.
This is probably the most serious objection of the lot. But there is a perfectly sensible reply: To the first question, the correct answer is that the
object is both a statue and a lump; to the second question there is no correct
answer. 20 If the doctrine of accidental sameness is true, a statue and its constitutive lump are numerically the same object. This fact seems sufficient
to entitle believers in accidental sameness to say that the object in R 'is'
both a statue and a lump, so long as they don't take this to imply either
that the statue is identical to the lump or that some statue or lump exemplifies contradictory essential properties. But if this view is right, how could
there be any correct answer to the question "What are its essential properties?" absent further information about whether the word 'it' is supposed
to refer to the statue or the lump? The pronoun is ambiguous, as is the
noun ('the object in R') to which it refers. 2 ! Thus, we would need to disambiguate before answering the question. Does this imply that there are two
material objects in R? It might appear to because we are accustomed to
finding ambiguity only in cases where a noun or pronoun refers to two
objects rather than one. But if the doctrine of accidental sameness is true,
we should also expect to find such ambiguity in cases of accidental sameness. Thus, to infer from the fact of pronoun ambiguity the conclusion that
there must be two objects in R is simply to beg the question against the
doctrine of accidental sameness.
So much for objections. Now, in closing this section, we would like to
make it clear how accidental sameness differs from two apparently similar
relations.
Those who have followed the recent literature on material constitution
will know that, like us, Lynne Baker has spoken of a relation that stands
"between identity and separate existence" (2000: 29) and that this relation
is (on her view) to be identified with the relation of material constitution.
On hearing this characterization, one might naturally think that what
Baker has in mind is something very much like accidental sameness. In
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fact, however, the similarity between accidental sameness and Baker-style
constitution ends with the characterization just quoted. Baker's definition
of constitution is somewhat complicated; but for present purposes we
needn't go into the details. Suffice it to say that, according to Baker, the
relation of material constitution is neither symmetric nor transitive whereas accidental sameness is both symmetric and transitive. (At least, it is synchronically transitive.) Lacking the same formal properties, the two relations could not possibly be the same. 22
OI'le might also naturally wonder whether what we call 'numerical sameness without identity' isn't just good old-fashioned relative identity under a
different name. Different views have been advertised in the literature under
the label 'relative identity'. But one doctrine that virtually all of these views
(and certainly all that deserve the label) share in common is the following:
(R1)

States of affairs of the following sort are possible: x is an F, y
is an F, x is a G, y is a G, x is the same F as y, but x is not the
sameG asy.

This is a claim that we will endorse too; and, like those who endorse the
Relative-Identity solution to the problem of the Trinity, it is a truth we rely
on in order to show that T1 - T3 are consistent with one another. It is for
this reason, and this reason alone, that we say that our solution may fruitfully be thought of as a version of the Relative Identity strategy. Despite
our commitment to R1, it would be a mistake to suppose that we endorse a
doctrine of relative identity. Our solution to the problem of the Trinity is
therefore importantly different from the Relative-Identity solution in its
purest form.23
How is it possible to accept R1 while at the same time rejecting relative
identity? The answer, as we see it, is that identity is truly relative only if
one of the following claims is true:
(R2)
(R3)

Statements of the form 'x = y' are incomplete and therefore
ill-formed. A proper identity statement has the form 'x is the
same F as y'.
Sortal-relative identity statements are more fundamental
than absolute identity statements.24

R2 is famously associated with P. T. Geach (1967, 1969, and 1973), whereas
R3 is defended by, among others, Nicholas Griffin (1977).25 Views according to which classical identity exists and is no less fundamental than other
sameness relations are simply not views according to which identity is relative. Perhaps, on those views, there are multiple sameness relations; and
perhaps some of those relations are both sortal-relative and such that R1 is
true of them. But so long as classical identity exists and is in no way derivative upon or less fundamental than they are, there seems to be no reason
whatsoever to think of other "sameness" relations as identity relations.
Thus, on views that reject both R2 and R3, there seems to be no reason for
thinking that identity is relative.
The difference between accidental sameness and relative identity is
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important, especially in the present context, because it highlights the fact that
there is more than one way to make sense of sameness without identity. It is
for this reason that endorsing Rl apart from R2 or R3 won't suffice all by
itself to solve the problem of the Trinity. As we have argued elsewhere (Rea
2003), absent an appropriate supplemental story about the metaphysics
underlying relative-identity relations, endorsing Rl apart from R2 or R3
leaves one, at best, with an incomplete solution to the problem of the Trinity
and, at worst, with an heretical solution. 26 We think that the doctrine of accidental sameness provides the right sort of supplemental story, and that the
solution it yields (in conjunction with Rl) is both complete and orthodox.
We suspect, moreover, that failure to distinguish different ways of making sense of sameness without identity is partly responsible for the attraction that the Relative-Identity solution holds for many. As is well known,
respected Christian philosophers and theologians-such as Augustine,
Anselm, and Aquinas-habitually speak of the Trinity in ways that require
the introduction of a form of sameness that fails Leibniz Law. But this way
of speaking, it is often assumed, can only be explained in terms of relative
identity.27 In light of what has just been said, however, we can see that this
assumption is false. Sameness without identity does not imply relative
identity, and hence any appeal to such sameness either to determine the
views of actual historical figures or to provide authoritative support for a
(pure) Relative-Identity solution is wholly misguided. Relative identity
does provide one way of explaining (numerical) sameness without identity, but it does not provide the only way of explaining it.

3. Sameness Without Identity and the Problem of The Trinity
If we accept the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution,
then, as we have seen, the familiar particulars of experience must be conceived of as hylomorphic compounds-that is, as matter-form structures
related to other things sharing their matter by the relation of accidental
sameness. The relevance of this Aristotelian solution to the problem of the
Trinity is perhaps already clear. For like the familiar particulars of experience, the Persons of the Trinity can also be conceived of in terms of hylomorphic compounds. Thus, we can think of the divine essence as playing the
role of matter; and we can regard the properties being a Father, being a Son,
and being a Spirit as distinct forms instantiated by the divine essence, each
giving rise to a distinct Person. As in the case of matter, moreover, we can
regard the divine essence not as an individual thing in its own right but
rather as that which, together with the requisite "fom1", constitutes a Person.
Each Person will then be a compound structure whose matter is the divine
essence and whose form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian properties.
On this way of thinking, the Persons of the Trinity are directly analogous to
particulars that stand in the familiar relation of material constitution.
Of course, there are also some obvious disanalogies. For example, in
contrast to ordinary material objects, the role of matter in the case of the
Trinity is played by immaterial stuff, and so the structures or compounds
constituted from the divine essence (namely, the divine persons) will be
'hylomorphic' only in an extended sense. Also, in the case of material
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objects, the form of a particular hylomorphic compound will typically only
be contingently instantiated by the matter. Not so, however, in the case of
the Trinity. For Christian orthodoxy requires us to say that properties like
being a Father and being a Son are essentially such as to be instantiated by
the divine essence. As we have seen, moreover, the relation of accidental
sameness on which our solution is modeled is, in Aristotle anyway, paradigmatically a relation between a substance (e.g., a man) and a hylomorphic
structure built out of the substance and an accidental property. The
Persons, however, are not like this. Thus, it is at best misleading to say that
the relation between them is one of accidental sameness. Better instead to go
with the more general label we have used throughout this paper: the
Persons stand in the relation of numerical sameness without identity.
As far as we can tell, none of these dis analogies are of deep import. It
seems not at all inappropriate to think of the divine Persons on analogy
with hylomorphic compounds; and once we do think of them this way, the
problem of the Trinity disappears. Return to the analogy with material
objects: According to the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material
constitution, a statue and its constitutive lump are two distinct hylomorphic compounds; yet they are numerically one material object. Likewise,
then, the Persons of the Trinity are three distinct Persons but numerically
one God. The key to understanding this is just to see that the right way to
count Gods resembles the right way to count material objects. Thus:
(GI)

x is a God iff x is a hylomorphic compound whose "matter"
is some divine essence; x is the same God as y iff x and y are
each hylomorphic compounds whose "matter" is some
divine essence and x's "matter" is the same "matter" as y's;
and there is exactly one God iff there is an x such that x is a
God and every God is the same God as x.

And, in light of GI, the following principle also seems reasonable:
(G2)

x is God iff x is a God and there is exactly one God.

If these principles are correct, and if (as Christians assume) there are three
(and only three) Persons that share the same divine essence, then we arrive
directly at the central Trinitarian claims T1 - T3 without contradiction. For
in that case, there will be three distinct Persons; each Person will be God (and
will be the same God as each of the other Persons); and there will be exactly
one God. Admittedly, if Gl is taken all by itself and without explanation, it
might appear just as mysterious as the conjunction of T1 - T3 initially
appeared. But that is to be expected. What is important is that once the parallel with M2 is appreciated, and the doctrine of numelical sameness without
identity is understood and embraced, much of the mystery goes away.
We are now in a position to see how our Aristotelian account of the Trinity
meets the desiderata we set out earlier for an adequate solution to the problem
of the Trinity (namely, 01-05). As should already be clear, our solution
resolves the apparent inconsistency of T1 - T3 in the same basic way that
Relative-Identity and Social-Trinitarian solutions do: namely, by rejecting the
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idea that the words 'is God' in Trinitarian statements like "Each of the Persons
is God" mean 'is absolutely identical with God'. According to our solution,
these words should be interpreted to mean 'is numerically the same as the one
and only God'. But once this interpretation of T2 is adopted-together with a
proper understanding of the relata of the relation of numerical sameness without identity-the apparent inconsistency of T1 - T3 is resolved, and in a way
that satisfies 01 and 02. For inasmuch as the Persons of the Trinity are distinct hylomorphic compounds, they are distinct from one another (hence T1 is
true); and inasmuch as they are each numerically the same as the one and only
God, each of them is God and there is only one God (hence T2 and T3 are
true). Moreover, since our solution implies that each of the Persons is a divine
individual who is one in number with each of the other two Persons, it is consistent with the claim that there are three Persons but exactly one divine individual (thus satisfying 01),28 and it also seems to preserve the intention of traditional formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity (thereby satisfying 02).
It should also be clear how our solution meets the other desiderata. Unlike
(pure) Relative-Identity solutions, ours is compatible with the claim that classical identity exists and is as fundamental as any other sameness relation (and
hence satisfies 04). Moreover, it supplies an explanation for why 'x = y' does
not follow from' x is the same God as y'. Unlike Social-Trinitarian strategies,
on the other hand, ours is clearly compatible with the view that God is an
individual rather than a society, and that the Persons are not parts of God
(and hence satisfies 03). Furthermore, our story about the unity of the
Persons exploits what we take to be a plausible story about the unity of distinct hylomorphic compounds, whereas no similarly plausible analogy seems
to be available to the social Trinitarian. Finally, though we deny that it makes
sense to say, unequivocally, that each of the Persons is absolutely identical
with God, our view-unlike either of the other two strategies-allows us to
say that the Father is identical with God, the Son is identical with God, the
Holy Spirit is identical with God, and yet the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are
distinct from one another. And it can do all of this without introducing any
anti-realist commitments in metaphysics (thus satisfying 05). Consider a
parallel drawn from one of our earlier examples: Athena is identical to the
material object in R; Lump is identical to the material object in R; but Athena
is distinct from Lump. Since 'the material object in R' is ambiguous, there is
no threat of contradiction; and the doctrine of numerical sameness without
identity blocks an inference to the claim that Lump and Athena are co-located
material objects. Likewise in the case of the Trinity.
For all these reasons, therefore, our Aristotelian solution to the problem
of the Trinity seems to us to be the most philosophically promising and
theologically satisfying solution currently on offer.

4. Important Consequences
This completes our defense of the Aristotelian account of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. As we see it, however, this account is not only interesting in its own right, but also has several important consequences. We close
by calling attention to two of these.
First, our solution suggests a revision in our understanding of the
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nature of the copula. Philosophers traditionally distinguish what is called
the 'is' of predication from the 'is' of identity. It is sometimes added, moreover, that any solution to the problem of material constitution that denies
that constitution is identity must introduce a third sense of 'is'. As Lynne
Baker says:
If the constitution view [i.e., the view that constitution is not identity]

is correct, then there is a third sense of 'is', distinct from the other
two. The third sense of 'is' is the 'is' of constitution (as in 'is (constituted by) a piece of marble').29
Baker seems to think that if constitution is not identity, there will have to
be three main senses of the copula, each co-ordinate with the other two.
But we can now see that this is a mistake. If our account of the Trinity is
correct, constitution can be explained in terms of something other than
identity (namely, accidental sameness). Even so, there will be only two
main senses of the copula, namely, the traditional 'is' of predication and a
heretofore unrecognized sense of the copula, the 'is' of numerical sameness. There will still be an 'is' of identity and an 'is' of constitution, as Baker
suggests, but these will both be subsumed under the second of the two
main senses just mentioned. Indeed, if we take into account all of the
changes suggested by our account of the Trinity, we will get a fairly complex set of relations holding between the various senses of the copula, as
the following diagram makes clear:

Different

(e.g., 'Socrates is wise')

A. 'Is' of Identity
(e.g., 'Cicero is Tully')

1. 'Is' of Accidental Sameness
(e.g., 'Athena is bronze')

'Is' of Essential Sameness
(e.g., 'The Father is God')

Faith and Philosophy

72

Second, our solution helps to make clear that both the problem of material
constitution and the problem of the Trinity are generated in part by the fact
that we have incompatible intuitions about how to count things. Thus, both
problems might plausibly be seen as special instances of a broader counting
problem-a problem that arises whenever we appear to have, on the one
hand, a single object of one sort (e.g., God or material object) and, on the other
hand, multiple coinciding objects of a different sort (e.g., Person, or hylomorphic compound). One significant advantage of the Aristotelian solution to the
problem of material constitution is that it alone seems to provide a unified
strategy for resolving the broader problem of which it is an instance. 30
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NOTES
1. For purposes here, an object x and an object y stand in the relation of
material constitution just in case x and y share all of the same material parts.
Thus, on our view, material constitution is both symmetric and transitive.
Contrary to some philosophers (e.g., Lynne Baker, discussed below) who treat
material constitution as asymmetric, we think that there are good theoretical
reasons for regarding it as a symmetric relation; but we will not attempt to
defend that view here.
2. Noonan 1988, 222.
3. Note, however, that we stop short of actually endorsing the solution
that we describe. There are three reasons for this. First, our solution, like most
others, attempts to provide a metaphysical account of the ultimate nature of
God. But surely here, if anywhere, a great deal of circumspection is warranted.
Second, the contemporary Trinitarian debate, as we see it, is still in its infancy;
hence a definitive stand on any particular solution, including our own, strikes
us as a bit premature. Third, the solution we develop strongly supports a specific understanding of material constitution (as will become clear in Section
4)-one that is at odds with some of our previously considered views on the
matter. (See, e.g., Rea 2000.) But, given the current state of the Trinitarian
debate, we are uncertain whether this fact should motivate us to change our
views about material constitution or to continue exploring yet other alternatives to the currently available accounts of the Trinity. Thus, it is important to
understand that we are not here aiming to resolve the contemporary
Trinitarian debate once and for all, but rather to advance it by introducing
what seems to us to be the most promising solution to the problem of the
Trinity developed so far.
4. Quicumque vult (our translation).
5. Denying that 'is God' means 'is absolutely identical with God' doesn't
guarantee that modalism is false; but making the denial removes any pressure
toward modalism that might arise out of T1 - T3.
6. See Rea 2003 and Brower 2004. Proponents of the Relative-Identity strategy include Cain (1989), Anscombe & Geach (1961, pp. 118-20)' Martinich (1978,
1979), and van Inwagen (1988). Proponents of the more typical versions of the
Social-Trinitarian strategy include Bartel (1993, 1994), Brown (1985,1989), Davis
(1999), Layman (1988), C. Plantinga (1986, 1988, 1989), and Swinburne (1994).
The position is commonly attributed to the Cappadocian Fathers. (See, esp.,
Brown 1985, Plantinga 1986, and Wolfson 1964). It is against these relatively
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typical versions of ST that our previously published objections most straightforwardly apply. Among the less typical versions of ST are, for example, Peter
Forrest's (1998), according to which the Persons are three "quasi-individuals"
that result from an event of divine fission, and CJ.F. Williams's (1994), according to which "God is the love of three Persons for each other." We reject
Forrest's view because it implies (among other things) that there is no fact about
whether there are one or many Gods, and there is no fact about whether there
are three or many more than three Persons. On his view, 'one' is the lowest correct answer to the question 'How many Gods are there?' and 'three' is the lowest correct answer to the question 'How many persons are there?'; but it is sheer
convention that allows us to say that' one' and 'three'-rather than, say 'twenty'
and 'two hundred and forty one'-are the correct answers to those questions.
As for Williams's view, we take it that his, along with other less common versions of ST, will fall prey to objections similar to those we raise against the more
typical versions. For further critical discussion of both the Relative-Identity
strategy and the Social-Trinitarian strategy, see Bartel 1988, Cartwright 1987,
Clark 1996, Feser 1997, Leftow 1999, and Merricks 2005.
7. Note that the point of 03 isn't to deny that the Persons compose a society. Of course they do, if there are genuinely three Persons. Rather, the point
of 03 is to deny both that the name 'God' refers to the society composed of
these Persons and that the Persons are proper parts of God. But if the society of
Persons is the Trinity, and the Trinity is God, doesn't it follow that 'God' refers
to the society of Persons after all? No. Each member of the Trinity is God, and
God "is a Trinity" (that is, He exists in three Persons). But nothing in orthodoxy seems to require that the Trinity is itself a whole composed of three
Persons and referred to by the name 'God'. Moreover, in light of objections to
Social Trinitarianism raised here and elsewhere, it seems that orthodoxy actually precludes us from saying such a thing (which is part of why we reject
Social Trinitarianism).
8. See Rea 1998 and Brower 2004.
9. For reasons that we shall explain below, the label 'accidental sameness'
is not appropriate in the context of the Trinity
10. This claim is negotiable; and, in fact, there are independent (nonAristotelian) reasons for thinking that "masses of matter" must be treated as
individuals. (See, e.g., Zimmerman 1995). But the view of matter articulated
here seems to comport best with Aristotle's metaphysiCS and with the solution
to the problem of the Trinity that we will propose, and so we will go ahead and
endorse it here. Those who think of masses of matter as individuals may be
inclined (in Section 3 below) also to think of what we will call "the divine
essence" as an individual. Were we to endorse this view, we would deny that
the divine essence is a fourth Person or a second God (just as we would deny
that Socrates's matter is a second man co-located with Socrates). Rather, we
would say that the divine essence is one in number with God, a sui generis individual distinct from the Persons and, indeed, nothing other than a substrate for
the Persons. We would also deny that there is any sense in which the divine
essence is prior to or independent of God.
11. We place 'its' in parentheses to signal our neutrality on the question
whether, say, the humanity of Plato is a special kind of trope or a multiply
instantiated universal.
12. See, e.g., Metaphysics H2, 1042b15-25.
13. Matthews 1982,1992.
14. Topics A7, l03a23-31; Physics A3, 190a17-21, 190b18-22; Metaphysics 06,
1015b16-22, 1016b32-1017a6; Metaphysics 09, 1024b30-1.
15. Topics A7, 103a23-31; Metaphysics 06, 1015bI6-22, 1016b32-1017a6.
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16. And, we might add, the same would hold true for Socrates and his matter, if indeed the matter of a thing were to be understood as an individual distinct from that thing.
17. See, e.g., Lewis 1993: 175, and Robinson 1985.
18. An object belongs to a kind in the nominal way just in case it displays
the superficial features distinctive of members of that kind.
19. Lewis 1986: 252.
20. We assume that 'object' in the context here means 'material object'.
21. Here is why 'the object in R' is ambiguous. There aren't two material
objects in R; and the material object in R isn't a third thing in addition to
Athena and Lump. 1hus, ,Athena = the material object in R' and 'Lump = the
material object in R' must both express truths. But they can't both express
truths unless either Lump = Athena (which the doctrine of accidental sameness
denies) or 'the material object in R' is ambiguous.
22. Baker's definition appears in both Baker 1999 and Baker 2000. For critical discussion, see Pereboom 2002, Rea 2002, Sider 2002, and Zimmerman 2002.
23. Elsewhere we distinguish between pure and impure versions of the
Relative Identity strategy (see Rea 2003). Impure versions endorse R1 without
endorsing a doctrine of relative identity; pure versions endorse R1 in conjunction with either R2 or R3 below. Our solution is thus an impure version of the
Relative Identity solution.
24. To say that sortal-relative identity statements are more fundamental
than absolute identity statements is, at least in part, to say that absolute identity statements are to be analyzed or defined in terms of more primitive sortal-relative identity statements, rather than the other way around. See Rea 2003 for
further discussion of views that endorse R3.
25. See also Routley & Griffin 1979.
26. This is, roughly, the problem that we think Peter van Inwagen's solution to the problem of the Trinity faces. (Cf. Rea 2003.)
27. For example, Cartwright (1987: 193) claims to detect an appeal to relative identity in a letter of Anselm, as well as the Eleventh Council of Toledo, on
just these grounds. The same sort of reasoning may also help to explain
Anscombe & Geach's (1961: 118) attribution of the Relative-Identity solution to
Aquinas.
28. Assuming, anyway, that counting divine individuals is more like counting Gods than counting Persons. But this assumption seems clearly legitimate in
context of D1.
29. Baker 1999:51.
30. This paper has benefited greatly from the advice and criticism of
Michael Bergmann, Jan Cover, Tom Crisp, William Hasker, John Hawthorne,
Michael Jacovices, Brian Leftow, Trenton Merricks, Laurie Paul, William Rowe,
and two anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy.

